

Message Text

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: FRG PAPER ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF

OPTION III

DELIVER DURING WOKING HOURS

1. FRG EMBASSY HERE PASSED US ON 4 SEPTEMBER A DRAFT
PAPER ON THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION III, ONE OF
THE TWO ADDITIONAL ALLIANCE PAPERS ON OPTION III REQUESTED
BY FRG. GERMAN EMBOFF SAID FRG INTENDED TO INTRODUCE
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THIS DRAFT, WHICH IS ALSO BEING PASSED TO THE BRITISH
IN LONDON, INTO THE SPC ON SEPTEMBER 9.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

.....PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION III

THE PROBLEM

1. MBFR-RESULTS WILL NOT ONLY HAVE TO BE JUDGED ACCORDING TO THEIR OBJECTIVE REPERCUSSIONS ON THE EXISTING MILITARY AND LEGAL SITUATION OF THE ALLIES. RATHER, THE ALLIANCE WILL ALSO HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CERTAIN POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS WHICH ARE LARGELY DETERMINED BY PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS. IN PARTICULAR, THE LONGER-TERM IMPACT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE SECURITY SITUATION OF THE WEST WILL DEPEND TO A DECISIVE DEGREE ON THE SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION IT WILL RECEIVE FROM THE WESTERN PUBLIC.

2. THIS IS NOT ONLY THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO AN AGREEMENT BUT ALSO REGARDING THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN TO WESTERN NEGOTIATING OFFERS IN THE WESTERN PUBLIC MAY DIRECTLY AFFECT THE SECURITY-MINDEDNESS IN SOME OR ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE ALLIANCE AND THUS INFLUENCE THE GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEFENSE.

WHEN RATING THE REACTIONS SO FAR TO NATO PROPOSALS AND THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WESTERN PRESS AND PUBLIC, ONE MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT PUBLIC INTEREST IN MBFR HAS BEEN SLIGHT UNTIL NOW. ALL THE SAME TIME, THE GENERALLY POSITIVE ATTITUDE TAKEN IN THE WEST CAN BE TRACED BACK TO A LARGE DEGREE TO THE PRIMA FACIE APPEAL OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND TO THE NONOBTRUSIVE BUT CONVINCING WORK OF WESTERN PRESS OFFICIALS.

IT SEEMS IMPORTANT TO ASSURE IN THE FUTURE AS WELL THAT NEITHER THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION NOR FUTURE NEGOTIATING RESULTS WILL BE MISINTERPRETED BY THE WESTERN PUBLIC--BE IT IN TERMS OF EUPHORIA OR IN TERMS OF UNJUSTIFIED, PESSIMISTIC CONCLUSIONS.

3. THIS IS OF VERY REAL CONCERN IN CONTEXT OF A POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN REDUCTIONS OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS (ALSO OF THE SECRET

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AIR FORCE) SINCE IT CANNOT BE EXCLUDED THAT SUCH A STEP WILL BE CONSIDERED AS A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSTURE, I.E., A SIMULTANEOUS ABANDONING OF THREE WESTERN POSITIONS SO FAR LOOKED UPON AS FUNDAMENTAL: NOT TO REDUCE WESTERN ARMAMENTS; AIR FORCES; AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

A CRITICAL RECEPTION OF SUCH A STEP SEEMS ALL THE MORE POSSIBLE AS THE "MIXED-PACKAGE-APPROACH" OF THE WESTERN OFFER DOES NOT CALL FOR STRICT RECIPROCITY. ONE CANNOT PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PUBLIC WILL SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATE THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THIS RESPECT.

4. THE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN A FUTURE WESTERN PROPOSAL IS MOST LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO MISINTERPRETATIONS. THIS IS TO BE EXPECTED AT ANY RATE IN WESTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

5. APART FROM THE INHERENT SIGNIFICANCE OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE IN WESTERN EUROPE THERE ARE HISTORICAL REASONS FOR THIS. IT MAY BE RECALLED THAT, AT THE TIME, WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS DID NOT FIND IT AN EASY TASK TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR PUBLICS THE RATIONALE FOR THE NUCLEAR POLICY OF THE ALLIANCE.

CRITICISM AGAINST THIS POLICY WAS REFUTED AT THAT TIME THROUGH POINTING OUT THAT:

--DETERRENCE AGAINST EASTERN AGGRESSION IN EUROPE ABSOLUTELY REQUIRES A STRONG NUCLEAR NATO POTENTIAL IN EUROPE

--THE MILITARY PRESENCE OF THE US IN EUROPE IMPLIES A NUCLEAR COMPONENT

--A NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE WEST,

--AN INTENSIVE THEATER NUCLEAR WAR IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF THE NEXUS EXISTING IN STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND PLANNING BETWEEN THE REGIONAL DETERRENT AND THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC POTENTIAL, ABOVE ALL THE AMERICAN ONE,

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--THE NON-NUCLEAR WESTERN ALLIES ARE ASSURED OF A HIGH DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION, BOTH IN PLANNING NUCLEAR USE AND IN THE EVENT OF SUCH USE, ABOVE ALL BY PROVIDING NUCLEAR DELIVERY MEANS OF THEIR OWN.

6. ON THE WHOLE, WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL WITH THIS LINE OF ARGUMENTATION. IT IS EXACTLY FOR THIS REASON THAT AN "OPTION III" PROPOSAL COULD BE INTERPRETED AS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS OF REORIENTATION AS FAR AS NUCLEAR POLICY IS CONCERNED, SETTING INTO MOTION A TREND TOWARDS:

--THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMS CONTROL ZONE IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE, FIRST WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS THINNED OUT, LATER FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH WOULD HAMPER FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF EUROPEAN MILITARY COOPERATION,

--DECREASING THE IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR SHARING BY NON-NUCLEAR ALLIES, BOTH IN TERMS OF INTRA-ALLIANCE RELATIONS AND OF THE CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENCE,

--DIMINISHING IN TWO WAYS THE ESCALATORY NEXUS OF THE

DETERRENT:

--THROUGH A DECREASE IN US STRIKE SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE, THUS INDICATING A TREND TOWARDS RELOCATING STRIKE FUNCTIONS OUTSIDE THIS AREA,

--THROUGH REDUCING THAT PART OF THE NUCLEAR POTENTIAL WITH WHICH AT LEAST THE PERIPHERY OF SOVIET TERRITORY CAN BE THREATENED FROM WESTERN EUROPE.

BOTH POINTS COULD SUGGEST CONCLUSIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT:

--THERE WAS A DECLINE IN THE CAPABILITY AND OR WILLINGNESS OF THE US TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE, RESORTING TO THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF ITS DETERRENT POTENTIAL, AND THAT,

--AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE WESTERN STRATEGY OF OVERALL DETERRENCE COULD SUFFER A SERIOUS LOSS OF CREDIBILITY.

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THE RAMIFICATIONS OF SUCH MISINTERPRETATIONS COULD BE MANIFOLD. IN CERTAIN PARLIAMENTS IT MIGHT CAUSE DIFFICULTIES; E.G., WITH THE FINANCING OF NEW OR MODERNIZED NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT (MRCA, LANCE, PERSHING). THE ASSUMPTION OF HAVING TO DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE EXCLUSIVELY WITH CONVENTIONAL MEANS OR THROUGH A "THEATRE NUCLEAR WAR" MIGHT BRING TO LIGHT SYMPTOMS OF DISCOURAGEMENT IN SOME MILITARY CIRCLES. LEFTIST EXTREMIST AND PACIFISTIC CIRCLES MIGHT MISUNDERSTAND "OPTION III" AS AN INDICATION THAT AGITATION FOR THE COMPLETE ABOLITION OF A NUCLEAR POSTURE MAY BE SUCCESSFUL AFTER ALL, IF ONLY IN THE WEST.

APPROACH TO A SOLUTION

7. IT MAY BE ASSUMED THAT THROUGH A CONVINCING PUBLIC POSTURE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS CAN EFFECTIVELY COUNTERACT AT LEAST SOME OF THE POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF CONCERN.

8. IN DOING SO, CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO HIGHLIGHT ARGUMENTS WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY DIMINISH THE BARGAINING POWER OF AN "OPTION III" PROPOSAL. IT WILL, HOWEVER, PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RECONCILE ENTIRELY THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF INTERNAL ARGUMENTATION AND OF OPTIMIZING THE VALUE OF SUCH A PROPOSAL WITHIN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

9. WE HAVE LISTED UNDER PARA 10-18 A SERIES OF DRAFT CONTINGENCY ARGUMENTS FOR USE, AS NECESSARY AND OPPORTUNE, BY ALLIES. ALLIED GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE GENERAL RULE TO USE THESE ARGUMENTS NOT ONLY REACTIVELY BUT ALSO OFFENSIVELY, WHEN OPPORTUNE AND NECESSARY. IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE WESTERN INTEREST

IF AN OVERREACTION VIS-A-VIS NEWS MEDIA ENCOURAGED THE METHOD OF "NEGOTIATING THROUGH THE PRESS."

DRAFT CONTINGENCY ARGUMENTS

10. TO EXPLAIN OFFER AS "MIXED PACKAGE" AND "ONE-TIME PROPOSAL":

--THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT THROUGH THE METHOD OF "MIXED PACKAGES." IN THE
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TERMINOLOGY OF ARMS CONTROL MIXED PACKAGES ARE AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT IN EVERY DETAIL SYMMETRICAL SINCE ALSO SUCH ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED WHICH ARE NOT IDENTICAL ON EITHER SIDE WHILE BEING OF SIMILAR SIGNIFICANCE WITHIN A STRATEGIC "EQUATION."

--NATO REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THE MAJOR DESTABILIZING FACTOR FOR THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE EASTERN GROUND FORCE PREPONDERANCE, PARTICULARLY IN MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE ALLIANCE THEREFORE MAINTAINS ITS VIEW THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST BRING ABOUT APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES TAKING INTO ACCOUNT A REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

--THIS--AND THIS ONLY--IS THE PURPOSE OF THE OFFER TO REDUCE CERTAIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. IT IS CORRECT THAT THE EAST FROM THE VERY BEGINNING PROPOSED A GENERAL ACROSS-THE-BOARD REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. NATO DOES NOT CONSIDER ACCEPTING THIS PROPOSITION. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ITS OWN ONE-TIME PROPOSAL AND AS FAR AS IT GOES, THE WEST DOES, HOWEVER, TAKE THE EASTERN POSITION INTO ACCOUNT.

11. TO EXPLAIN THE "MAKE WEIGHT" CHARACTER OF THE OFFER:

THE ALLIANCE PURSUES ITS ORIGINAL AIM OF BRINGING ABOUT THROUGH MBFR A BALANCED GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP. THE NUCLEAR OFFER SERVES AS AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE JUST THIS. THUS THE ALLIANCE DID NOT ACCEPT THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF GENERALLY INCLUDING NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS. RATHER, THE (WESTERN) NUCLEAR OFFER IS DESIGNED TO INCREASE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN PROPOSAL OF ESTABLISHING A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING. IN OTHER WORDS: IT SHOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT NOW FOR THE EAST TO BLOCK THE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH REFUSING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE GROUND FORCE PARITY.

12. TO ASSURE THE EXCLUSION OF EUROPEAN SYSTEMS:

A REDUCTION OF NON-US NUCLEAR DELIVERY MEANS AND, CONSEQUENTLY THE INCLUSION OF (WEST) EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS IN

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REDUCTIONS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. THEREFORE, THERE WILL NOT BE NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS ON NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS OR ON EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

13. TO EXPLAIN THE LIMITS OF THE OFFER:

THE NUCLEAR OFFER IS VALID PROVIDED THE EAST SHOWS ITSELF READY TO AGREE TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF ESTABLISHING APPROXIMATE GROUND FORCE PARITY AND ONLY IN THAT EVENT. IT IS THEREFORE A ONE-TIME OFFER WHICH CANNOT BE INTERPRETED AS INDICATING A TREND TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISENGAGEMENT. THE REDUCTIONS OFFERED WOULD ONLY CONCERN SOME NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AND THESE WOULD ONLY BE DECREASED BY A CERTAIN CALCULATED NUMBER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ABILITY TO CARRY OUT NUCLEAR DEFENSE AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS, ALSO BASED ON EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION, WILL NOT BE JEOPARDIZED.

14. TO ASSURE CONTINUED NUCLEAR SHARING:

WITHIN THE ALLIANCE CARE HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ASSURE THAT THE PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR DEFENSE OF THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPE --"NUCLEAR SHARING"--WILL REMAIN AS IT IS. THE NON-US NUCLEAR UNITS WILL FULLY MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT FUNCTION AND EFFECTIVENESS.

15. TO EXPLAIN THAT NATO'S STRATEGY REMAINS VALID:

THE UNITED STATES HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WILL NOT EXCLUDE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHATSOEVER THE INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY IN CASE WESTERN EUROPE SHOULD BECOME THE VICTIM OF MAJOR AGGRESSION. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE QUESTION OF "NO-FIRST USE" AND THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

16. TO EXPLAIN THAT STRATEGIC "DECOUPLING" WILL NOT TAKE PLACE:

THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND WARHEADS WOULD CONTINUE TO REPRESENT A STRONG TACTICAL-NUCLEAR POTENTIAL AND ASSURE THEREBY THE ESCALATORY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE IN EUROPE AND THE STRATEGIC-NUCLEAR FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES. IT IS ALSO ASSURED THAT THE REMAINING US SYSTEMS CAN CARRY OUT THE TASKS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO THEM.

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TION BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE IN EUROPE AND THE STRATEGIC-NUCLEAR FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES. IT IS ALSO ASSURED THAT THE REMAINING US SYSTEMS CAN CARRY OUT THE TASKS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO THEM.

IN MANY WAYS, THE US STRATEGIC FORCES WILL REMAIN INTER-WOVEN WITH THE OTHER TWO COMPONENTS OF WHAT IS CALLED THE "TRIAD" OF NATO DEFENSE. THIS FACT IS ALSO SUBSTANTIATED BY PLANS TO INCREASE THOSE US STRATEGIC FORCES SUPPORTING ALLIED FORCES IN EUROPE, E.G. THE SEA-BASED MISSILE SYSTEMS OF THE POSEIDON TYPE.

THE OFFER OF REDUCING CERTAIN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS THEREFORE WILL NOT LEAD TO A "DECOUPLING" OF THE ESCALATORY CONNECTION OF NATO'S DETERRENCE.

17. TO ASSURE CONTINUED IR-MRBM TARGET COVERAGE:

THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING OFFER DOES NOT PUT INTO QUESTION THE PRESENT COVERAGE OF THOSE SOVIET IR-MRBM'S WHICH ARE TARGETED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE.

18. TO EXPLAIN LACK OF FULL RECIPROCITY:
(REPEAT CONTINGENCE ANSWER NO. 1)

SINCE NATO IS TRYING TO BRING ABOUT A "MIXED PACKAGE" DEAL IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT TREATY OBLIGATIONS WOULD NOT BE RECIPROCAL IN DETAIL. FULL RECIPROCITY WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE AT ANY RATE BECAUSE THIS WOULD IMPLY THAT ALL ARMAMENTS OF ALL ARMED SERVICES OF ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE LIMITED. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE WELL THOUGHT OUT BASIC WESTERN CONCEPT OF FOCUSING LIMITATIONS ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

ONE MAY ADD THAT MBFR AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO MARKEDLY ALTER THE THREAT WHICH EMANATES FROM SOVIET NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES DIRECTED AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE. THIS IS SO BECAUSE WESTERN EUROPE CAN BE FULLY THREATENED FROM SOVIET TERRITORY WHICH LIES OUTSIDE OF THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTIONS. END TEXT. KISSINGER

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